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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN OHIO AGAINST FALSE
ADVERTISING AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
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PRE-EXISTING OHIO AND FEDERAL PUBLIC LAW
False Advertising and Misbranding of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics
Before the passage of Am. Sub. House Bill No. 39, which became ef-
fective September 25, 1969, Ohio regulated the advertising and labeling of
food, drugs and cosmetics. The Ohio statutes prohibit false advertising
with respect to such items.' Apparently the intent of the actor is not at
issue because the focus of the legislation is on effect. An advertisement is
false "if it is false or misleading in any particular. ' 2 An item is misbranded
if the labeling is "false or misleading."3  Provision is made for misde-
meanor penalties if violations are found. In misbranding cases the director
of agriculture or the board of pharmacy may place an embargo on the
offensive items and may petition in court for an order of condemnation.4
The court, if it finds a case of misleading labeling, may order the respond-
ent to correct the misbranding if possible; otherwise the item is destroyed.
In less severe cases the director of agriculture or the board of pharmacy
may simply give written notice to the offender, with an opportunity to correct
the violation.5 These sections of the code appear to be little used because
no annotations were noted thereunder. In 1969, despite its statutory au-
thority, the department of agriculture did not initiate any criminal prosecu-
tions and only about fifty embargo actions were initiated." Departmental
enforcement consisted for the most part of sending out letters of warning
to offenders. 7  In cases involving deceptive advertising by meat retailers,
the department was particularly ineffectual. On complaint by a customer
or because of departmental initiative, offenders are warned by letter, but a
department spokesman admitted that the illegal activities are often re-
sumed after a few months cessation. The dearth of criminal prosecutions
Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law.
'OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 3715.52(e) (Page 1954). The Ohio Statutes also prohibit
falsely advertising "anything of value" offered for "use, purchase, or sale." OHIO REV .CODE
ANN. § 2911.41 (Page 1954). Enforcement of this section, however, is left to local prosecutors,
rather than an administrative agency. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.42. With the work-
load occasioned by such cases as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), local prosecutors
will be less inclined to prosecute under the general false advertising statute than the agencies are
inclined to do under the more specific statutes. Infra, notes 6 and 7.
2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3715.68(A) (Page 1954).
3 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3715.60,3715.64,3715.67 (Page 1954).
4OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3715.55 (Page 1954).
5 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3715.57 (Page 1954).
8 Telephone conversation with the department on July 15, 1970.
7 About 150 letters of warning were sent to offenders.
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was attributed to the unwillingness of private citizens to initiate and follow
through on criminal actions.
Criminal Fraud
The crime of false pretenses is knowingly and designedly obtaining the
property of another by means of untrue representations of fact with intent
to defraud." The crime requires that the defendant have knowledge of the
falsity of his representation.' However, the real flaws in the offense lie in
the requirement that there be an untrue representation of fact. A statement
of opinion is not a statement of fact and therefore not indictable, unless
expressed as a fact.10 Although a promise made with no intent to perform
it is a statement of fact, i.e., the speaker's state of mind, the courts have
virtually unanimously held that a false promise is not the proper subject of
indictment." Such conduct may form the basis for a private action in tort
or on the contract,' 2 but does not constitute a crime. These holes in the law
render it particularly useless in false advertising cases where much of what
is said falls under the heading of opinion, puffing or "trade talk" and yet
may constitute the basis for sales of goods made as a result of deceptive
advertising. In addition, there is real hesitancy by prosecutors to indict
business men who are regarded as the pillars of the community, even though
rogues may abound in their midst.13
Existing FTC jurisdiction and Powers
The Federal Trade Commission was created in 1914 and from the first,
in addition to prohibiting trade restraint, it has seen fit to interdict false
advertising. 4 In the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938 Congress made unlawful
misrepresentations concerning food, drugs, and cosmetics and as a result
gave the FTC authority to prohibit them generally as "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices."' 15 The FTC's jurisdiction is over acts and practices or
methods of competition in commerce. 16 However, the FTC has asserted
jurisdiction over acts that are essentially intrastate in character although
interstate in impact.'7 Further, the FTC has asserted jurisdiction over ad-
vertising solely on the basis that it is carried in media crossing the state
8 PERINS, CRIMINAL LAw 297 (2d ed. 1969).
9 OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.01 (Page 1954).
1oWilliams v. State, 77 Ohio St. 468,83 N.E. 802 (1908).
11 Perkins, supra note 8, at 304. Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. 280,283 (1855).
'
2 Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Ore. 354, 55 P.2d 1122 (1936).
18 C. KATrz, THE LAW AND THE Low INcomE CONSUMER 33-34 (1968).
14 Circle Cilk Co., 1 F.T.C. 13 (1916).
1552 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1964); 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
16 FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). Proposed legislation would expand the FTC's
jurisdiction to include acts which "affect commerce." S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1970).
17 E.g., Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961).
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lines."' The FTC is empowered to identify violations and to issue cease-
and-desist orders. 19 The Justice Department is charged with prosecuting
violations of the cease-and-desist orders. 20  The focus of the FTC in its at-
tacks on false advertising is on the impact of the advertising and not on the
asserter's fault whether intentional or negligent.2 1 And, unlike strict
liability in tort, FTC false representation law does not require a showing of
harm to its victims. Further, it appears not to give a private remedy to
those injured by false advertising.22 The FTC has a responsibility to pro-
tect "that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and
the credulous." 23 That is to say the FTC will weigh the effect of the state-
ment against the lowest common denominator of the audience it seeks to
protect, which is composed of "dolts" if compared to the mythical "reason-
able man" of tort law.
When you-or we-are deciding whether a trade practice is likely to
mislead the public, I think it important to bear in mind that the objective
is to protect the whole public, not just the high school or college gradu-
ates, or people with an I.Q. of 100 or above, or the "average" man, who-
ever he is. The extent of this problem is not inconsiderable, because prob-
ably 20% of the population has an I.Q. below 90, and 1/3 of adults read
at not better than seventh grade level. I am not saying that we should in-
sist on advertising being moronic; but I am saying that in deciding whether
violation of a deceptive practice statute has occurred, we should consider
the degree of understanding of the consumer audience to whom the ad-
vertising or selling method is addressed.24
The FTC has been criticized for its complex and time-consuming pro-
cedures which lead to weak enforcement.2 5  Some of the wealthier adver-
tisers deliberately take advantage of FTC procedures and lengthy court
battles to continue profitable sales of misrepresented products for as long
as possible.26  The FTC's ineffectiveness has been attributed to its lack of
power to imprison, fine, or assess or award damages. At most it can issue a
cease-and-desist order which can be appealed to the courts within sixty
days after issuance.27  On the other hand, the mere threat of an FTC in-
1 8 Shafe v. FTC, 256 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1958).
19 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
20 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1964).
21 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
22 Cf. G. ALExANDER, HONEST AND COMPETION 9, n.59 (1967).
23 Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944).
24 Address by Gale P. Gotschall, Assistant General Counsel for Federal-State Cooperation,
Federal Trade Commission, "Why FTC Seeks Aid of the Attorneys General in Combating Con-
sumer Deception and Unfair Competition," before the Western Conference of National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General, Santa Fe, N.M., Sept 2, 1966, pp. 7-8.
2 5 KATz, supra, note 13 at 51.
20 id.
27 FTC, Here is Your Federal Trade Commission 4 (1964).
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vestigation with its resulting bad publicity is enough deterrence for many
honest businessmen.28
The U.S. Post Office Department discourages would-be hucksters and
constitutes a definite deterrent to sharp operators. A postal fraud statute
provides criminal penalties for using the mail to defraud 9 An administra-
tive statute empowers the Postmaster General to stop incoming mail from
reaching the fraudulent operator.30  The Post Office Department has an
official policy that it has no authority to recover money or property or to
take any action to adjust an unsatisfactory transaction. 1 However, some
inspectors will begin processing complaints of mail fraud even if only a
civil question is involved, and will try to resolve the matter by letter or
telephone. If the inspector concludes intent to defraud is present, his find-
ings will be submitted to a United States Attorney who decides whether to
prosecute.8 2
The criminal fraud statute requires proof of a scheme to defraud and
the use of the mails for execution of the scheme.33 There is no require-
ment that anyone actually be defrauded or even a likelihood of fraud.34
And, unlike the civil law of fraud, fraud can be found in 'puffing" or
"trader's talk.", For these and other reasons, a conviction was obtained
in ninety-nine percent of the cases tried in fiscal 1964.86
ANALYSIS oF AM. SUB. H.B. No. 39
Passing Off
Am. Sub. H.B. No. 39 adopts the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act in Ohio almost verbatim, although with some important omissions.
The heart of the statute consists of prohibited acts described in the legisla-
tion as "deceptive trade practices." These trade practices involve roughly
either misleading trade identification or deceptive advertising. The first
deceptive trade practice is passing off goods or services as those of an-
other."7 "Passing off" is simply "a convenient name for the doctrine that
no one should be allowed to sell his goods as those of another. '38  Use of
2 8 OGILVy, CONFESSIONS OF AN ADVERTISING MAN 93 (1963).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
30 74 Star. 654 (1960), 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964). 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1964) provides that no
false advertisement may be disseminated through use of the mails.
31 U.S. Post Office Dept, How the Postal lnspection Service Protects You Against fail Fraud
(1964).
3 2 KATZ, supra, note 13, at 47.
33 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).
34 E.g., Hermansen v. United States, 230 F.2d 173-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924
(1956).
35 United States v. Whitmore, 97 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
3 6 KATZ, supra note 13, at 47.
3 7 OaI-o REv. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(A) (Page 1965).
8 Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924). It is also illegal
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a name or letter, or of a mark which is the same as that used by an estab-
lished business constitutes passing off. Implicit in the right to relief of the
injured competitor is the idea that he has acquired by his efforts a right in
a name or other symbol which the courts will protect.3 9 The other inter-
est the courts are protecting is the public interest in the circulation of
merchandise which will stand on its own merits without resort to deception
or confusion with other products as a means of sale.40  The term "passing
off" is also used to describe covert substitution of a different brand of
goods for the one requested by a customer.41 Passing off is established as
a tort at common law.42  Although not highly enthusiastic, the FTC will
occasionally intervene in these cases.43
Confusion As to Source, etc.
It is a deceptive trade practice to cause a "likelihood of confusion or mis-
understanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of
goods or services."44  This section from the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act forbids trade symbol infringement and reflects the trend of
authority.45 The following examples illustrate the breadth of potentially
actionable confusion under the Uniform Act:
likelihood of confusion as to source exists where consumers may errone-
ously believe that the wellknown 'Yale' lock company manufactures a de-
fendant's 'Yale' flashlights; likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship exists
where consumer may erroneously believe that Seventeen magazine sponsors
a defendant's 'Seventeen' girdles; likelihood of confusion as to approval
exists where consumers may erroneously believe that Consumer Reports
has approved a defendant's air-conditioner as a 'Best Buy;' and likelihood
of confusion as to certification exists where consumers may erroneously
believe that Underwriters' Laboratories has authorized use of its seal of
approval on a defendant's toaster.46
to cause a likelihood of confusion by use of misleading trade names. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4165.02(c) (Page 1965). E.g., The Drake Medicine Co. and Drake v. Glessner, 68 Ohio
St. 337, 67 N.E. 722 (1903) ("Dr. Drake's German Croup Remedy" versus "Dr. Drake's
Famous German Croup Remedy.")
39 In Lloyd Bros. v. William S. Merrill Chem. Co., 25 W. L. Bull. 319 (Super. Ct. 1891)
the court protected plaintiffs' trade-mark in the word "Asepsin" by granting an injunction pro-
hibiting defendant from using the name.
4 0 French Bros. Dairy Co. v. John Giacin, 12 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 134 aff'd, 84 Ohio St. 483
(1911); Cloverleaf Restaurants Inc. v. Lenihan, 79 Ohio App. 493, 72 N.E.2d 761 (1946).
4 1 E.g., Block Light Co. v. Tappehorn, 2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 553 (C.P. Hamilton 1904).
42 Safe-Cabinet Co. v. Globe Wernicke Co., 3 Ohio App. 24, 144 N.E. 711 (1924) -mod
and aft'd, 92 Ohio St. 532, 112 N.E. 478 (1915). OHIO REv. CODE § 2913.07 makes it a
crime to willfully counterfeit a trade-mark with intent to use it for passing off purposes.
4 3 ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 159-61.
44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(B) (Page 1965).
4 1E.g., Triangle Pub., Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948); See REsTATEMENT
(SECOND); TORTS § 717 and comments (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
46 Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
76 YALE L.J. 485, 487 n. 15 (1967).
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It is also a deceptive trade practice to use misleading descriptive repre-
sentations and designations of geographic originY.4 7 Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Trademark Act contains an analogous provision.48  The FTC will
prohibit the false use of a name of geographic origin when the geographic
location has become associated with favorable product characteristics. 40
The FTC follows private trademark law in the theory that geographic
names are not subject to exclusive appropriation by the first user but re-
main available for the common use of others so located. 0 However, there
is an exception when a geographic name has acquired secondary meaning
as the source indicator of a single producer's products.1
False Advertising
It is a deceptive trade practice to falsely represent sponsorship, "char-
acteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities." ' This conduct in-
cludes false representations that a person is the representative, successor,
associate, or affiliate of another."3 It also includes false statements that
goods were designed, approved, or sponsored by another."
It is a deceptive trade practice to fail to reveal the prior use of goods.5
This conduct was declared illegal at common law.58 The FTC will pro-
hibit such conduct or may affirmatively order a promoter to fully reveal
characteristics of the product marketed. 57  It is also illegal to misrepresent
the quality, grade or model of goods.58 This conduct was also illegal un-
der both common and federal law.59
47 OrIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (D) (Page 1965).
48 § 43(a) 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1958).
49 Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. FTC, 327 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 992 (1964) (use of Swiss movements).
503 CALLMAN, UNFAm COMPETITON AND TRADEMARKS 1121 n. 80 (2d ed. 1950).
511d. at 1225 n. 81. See also, Cincinnati Vid Shoe Co. v. Cincinnati Shoe Co., 9 Ohio Dec.
579, 583 (Super. Ct. 1899): "It is true that georgraphical or generic names cannot be the subject
of a trade-mark; but it is not true that a person using such words in unfair competition so that
the public, by the use of such words, are led to suppose that they are buying the goods of one per-
son when in fact they are buying the goods of another, may not be restrained from so using such
words."
5 2 OpO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(E) (Page 1954).
53 E.g., Alaska Sales and Service, Inc. v. Rutledge, 128 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1955) (false
representation of automobile dealership franchise). In Lipman v. Martin, 5 Ohio N.P. 120
(Super Ct. 1898) the defendant had modeled his store, which was next to plaintiff's, so as to look
like part of plaintiff's establishment. The court enjoined the defendant from representing his
business, in any manner, as the business of the plaintiff, and from giving his store the appearance
of being part of plaintiff's.
54 Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Section 2 (a) (5), Comment.
5 8 H o REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(F) (Page 1965).58 E.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947) (alternative holding)-
(requiring disclosure that spark plugs were repaired).
57E.g., Mohawk Refining Corp. v. F.T.C., 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814
(1959), order modified, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 5 17,710 (FTC 1966) (greater disclosure in
advertising and representing that oil is re-refined).
-9OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(G) (Page 1965).
59 E.g., Burlington Mills Corp. v. Roy Fabrics, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. N.Y.), a/Id per
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Professor Dole has concluded that decisions under analogous § 43 (a)
of the federal Lanham Trademark Act suggest that a person who invokes
these false advertising provisions will have to show that the defendant's ad-
vertisement is a false representation of "fact." 60 He goes on to point out
that the "shrewd use of exaggeration, innuendo, ambiguity and half-truth
is more efficacious from the advertiser's standpoint than factual assertions," 61
but that the Uniform Act should not be so "literally and woodenly" inter-
preted . 2  I agree. In Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co.63, Judge
Learned Hand discounted as non-actionable misrepresentations about a
vacuum cleaner to the effect that
it was absolutely perfect in even the smallest detail ... ; that it was so
simple a child of sbc could use it; that it worked completely and thorough-
ly; that it was . . . long-lived, easily operated, and effective; that it was
the only sanitary portable deaner on the market . . . ; and that perfect
satisfaction would result from its use, if properly adjusted.64
These statements artfully blend ambiguities and generalities with the as-
sertion that the product is long lasting, relate to its quality, and should
be actionable under the Uniform Act 5
Trade Disparagement
It is a deceptive trade practice to disparage the "goods, services, or
business of another by false representation of fact."6  Every beginning
law student is familiar with this practice as a common law tort because
curiam, 182 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1950) (semble) (forbidding sale of second grade materials as
first grade); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
60 Dole, supra note 46, at 489.
61 Quoting from HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 982 (3d ed. 1960).
02 Dole, supra note 46, at 489.
63248 F. 853 (2d Cir. 1918).
641d. at 855.
65 § 2(a) (7), OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(G) (Page 1965). Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) held actionable a statement that a windshield would not
shatter under the hardest impact as a representation of quality, where it shattered and caused
injury. The statement is dearly one of fact. The Deceptive Trade Practices Act, however, re-
quires only a "likelihood of confusion" in certain cases of misleading trade identification in
Sections 2(a) (2) and (3), Owo REv. CODE §§ 4165.02(B) and (C), and confers standing
to invoke its provisions on any person "likely to be damaged" in section 3(a), OIo REv. CODE
§ 4165.03 (Page 1965). If in fact advertising statements are untrue even though they are
"mere puffing" or dealer's talk, or are difficult to identify as statements of fact, as in Vulcan Met-
als, one is prompted to inquire as to why the advertiser finds it necessary to resort to them. In
such marginal cases as Vulcan Metals, the court ought not to be as hesitant to grant injunctive
relief as it is to award damages. However, Om'o REv. CODE § 2911.42 which authorizes a
prosecuting attorney to bring suit to enjoin false or fraudulent advertising practices has been
interpreted not to apply to puffing or dealer's talk. State v. Schaengold, 13 Ohio L. Rep. 130,
133 (Cincinnati Mun. C. 1915): "Puffing seems to have at all times been considered legitimate
and ethical, and defendant cites recent advertisements of local merchants offering . . . $15.00
suits for $8.90, etc., but there is a vast distinction between exaggerating the value or comparative
quality and efficiency of an article and that of falsely misrepresenting such article."
0 0 Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(H) (Page 1965).
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of familiarity with the ancient English case wherein a brewer complained
of an assertion by a competitor that he would give a peck of malt to his
mare, and "she should pisse as good beare as Dickes doth Brew."67  Dis-
paragement by competitors was enjoinable at common law.6"
"Bait and Switch" Advertising
The Ohio statute makes it a deceptive practice for a seller to utilize
"bait advertising," a practice by which a seller seeks to attract customers by
advertising at low prices products which he does not intend to sell in more
than nominal amounts. 9 When the customer shows up at the store, the
seller discourages purchasing the 'bait," and tries to "switch" the customer
to a higher priced item. This is accomplished by disparaging the bait or by
exhausting what was a miniscule stock to begin with.70  Particularly timely
are bait advertising schemes of meat retailers who sell bulk quantities of
hanging beef by baiting customers with promises of low priced steaks.
When the customer appears he is told the advertised beef, which is com-
mercial or low grade, is undesirable, and is switched to a much higher priced
grade.
"Bait Advertising" has been held enjoinable at common law by the
manufacturer of the bait,71 and Ohio authorized by statute local prosecutors
to seek such relief.72  The FTC takes the position that it is improper to as-
sert the availability of a product which is not available for sale or which is
available only in a form that is unacceptable to most customers.73  Loss-
leader selling wherein the seller tries to boost general sales by selling a
leading item at or below cost is acceptable, however. This is true unless the
seller tampers with the bait so that its performance is discouraging, dis-
guises unpopular features or makes independent deceptive representations
to disparage the announced product.74
67 Dickes v. Fenne, 1 March 93, 1 Rolle Abr. 58, W. Jones 444 (K.B. 1639).
68 E.g., Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1929), cert. den., 281 U.S.
737 (1930). Cf. Hagmeier v. Hulshizer, 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 507 (C.P. Licking 1910) held
sufficient against a general demurrer allegations in a petition that defendant circularized material
disparaging plaintiff's flour. The court characterized the alleged conduct as libelous, but Prosser
points out that if the statement reflects only upon the quality of what plaintiff has to sell, rather
than on plaintiff personally, it is not defamatory; proof of special damage is essential to the cause
of action and falsehood is not presumed, while in defamation truth is always a matter of de-
fense, and damage need not be proved if the publication is actionable "per se." PRosSER, CASES
AND MATERIALS 1105, n.1 (4th ed. 1967).69 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(I), (K) (Page 1965).
70 Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Section 2(a)(9-10), Comment.
71 Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S. 2d
977 (1959).
72 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.41 (Page Supp. 1969), OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.42.
The statute has had little use and does not apply to good faith broadcasters or publishers through
whom most of the bait and switch tactics are perpetrated on the public. Additionally, "intent,
design or purpose" is required as part of the bait and switch scheme.
73 Earl A. Scheib, Inc., 63 F.T.C. 1049 (1963).




It is a deceptive trade practice to advertise spurious "fire" and "liquida-
tion" sales as well as to make misrepresentations as to fictitious price cuts. 5
The FTC will interdict false claims as to price cuts. For example, in
Sidney J. Kreiss, Inc.,76 two FTC Commissioners were persuaded that an
advertised sales price was illegitimate even though there were only two
sales per year which never lasted more than four weeks each. However, 95
percent of the sales items were sold during these sales.
The FTC gives the following as an example of fraudulent price claims:
John Doe is a retailer of Brand X fountain pens, which cost him $5 each.
His usual markup is 50 percent over cost; that is, his regular retail price is
$7.50. In order subsequently to offer an unusual "bargain," Doe begins
offering Brand X at $10 per pen. He realizes that he will be able to sell
no, or very few, pens at this inflated price. But he doesn't care, for he
maintains that price for only a few days. Then he "cuts" the price to its
usual level-$7.50-and advertises: "Terrific Bargain: X Pens, Were $10,
Now Only $7.50 !" This is obviously a false claim. The advertised "bar-
gain" is not genuine.77
Other examples of deceptive price advertising include use of a fictitious
"former" price, advertising a "cut" from a manufacturer's list price when
in fact the list price is seldom if ever followed, and advertising a retail price
as a "wholesale" price.7 8
REMEDIES UNDER Am. SUB. H.B. 39
If a deceptive trade practice is found the Ohio statute authorizes a
person who is "likely to be damaged" to obtain an injunction against con-
tinuation of the conduct.79 This remedy, drawn from common law equity
principles, constitutes the working section of the Uniform Deceptive Prac-
tices Act. The specific statutory authorization of suit in the Uniform Act
was particularly necessary for a competitor because there was an early rash
of decisions that the competitor as such had no standing to sue for deceptive
trade practices. 0 Sometimes cases were dismissed because the unfair trade
practice of the competitor was characterized as a public nuisance.8' The
Ohio statute dispenses with a requirement that monetary damages be
7 5 OHxO REv. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(J) (Page 1965). In Straum v. State, 15 Ohio App. 32
(1921) the court held that where there was a reduction in terms of payment for new Victrolas
the defendant's advertising of "special reductions" was not false advertising within the meaning
of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.41 (Page 1954).
76 56 F.T.C. 1421 (1960) (The Commission split 3-2).
77 ALExANDER, supra note 22 at 253-54, Appendix J.
781 d.
7oOHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.03 (Page 1965).
804 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COmPEnON, TRADEmARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 87.1(a)(1)
(3d ed. 1970).
1 Moon v. Clark, 192 Ga. 47, 14 S.E.2d 481 (1941).
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proven.2 In cases where the court finds that the defendant willfully en-
gaged in the conduct, attorneys' fees may be awarded to the plaintiff. If the
court finds the action was groundless it may award attorneys' fees to the
defendant.8 3 In either case the award of attorneys' fees is subject to judi-
cial discretion. Like the FTC, the statute focuses primarily on the impact
of the defendant's conduct, and not on the actor's intent. By conferring
standing on a person "likely to be damaged" by a deceptive trade practice,
the legislature has caused the statute to reach unintentional as well as in-
tentional conduct.84  The statute limits the primary relief to an injunction
and does not at all concern itself with damages because of the difficulty
of proving damages among other reasons.85
It should not be assumed that the Ohio statute will be an adequate tool
for policing sellers' practices if use of the legislation is limited to injured
competitors. Consumer welfare groups may be the best answer for keeping
unscrupulous merchants in line. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act originated as an effort to reform the law of business torts, not consumer
torts. However, at first blush the Act would seem to confer standing on a
consumer as "a person likely to be damaged." Such individual consumers
then could bring a consumer class action, which has been promoted as an
effective tool under the Uniform Act. 6 Poverty lawyers have used the
"representative suit" or class action to secure civil rights in the area of
school desegration, 87 legislative reapportionment, 8 and to change welfare
eligibility rules.89 A class action promotes more careful judicial admin-
istration, allows consumers with small claims to meet jurisdictional
amounts and puts economic, psychological and procedural pressure on a
defendant.0  Individual standing provides the foundation for consumer
82 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.03 (Page 1965).
83 ld.
84 Dole, supra note 46, at 495. Section 3(a) of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
eliminates the requirement of proof of "intent to deceive." The Ohio version does not specifi-
cally eliminate such requirement. However, since it does confer standing on "a person likely to
be damaged," and requires proof that defendant "willfully engaged in the trade practice knowing
it to be deceptive" to assess attorneys' fees against a defendant, the better interpretation would
not require proof of intent for an injunction except in bait and switch cases under OHIO REV.
CODE § 4165.02 (I) and (K), which specifically require intent.
85 2 NiMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADEMARKS 1390 (4th ed. 1947).
80 Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968
DuKE L.J. 1101. Individual Consumer standing seems also to be sanctioned by the language in
the statute that "A complainant need not prove competition between the parties." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (Page 1965).
87 E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 8 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
89 E.g., King v .Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
90 Dole, supra note 86, at 1102-03. Ohio allows the claims of the class to be aggregated in
determining the jurisdiction of the court. Rule 23(F), Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. But see
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), holding that aggegation of the claims of class members
under the 1966 Revision of Federal Rule 23 in order to establish the $10,000 jurisdictional
amount will not be permitted unless it would have been permitted under the old Rule 23, which
permitted aggregation only in true or hybrid class actions where named and unnamed persons
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class actions. Professor Dole has raised the issue of the individual plain-
tiff consumer's standing:
Only a person 'likely to be damaged' can sue for injunctive relief under the
Act; yet why should a consumer who knows that a merchant is engaging
in trickery need an injunction to protect himself in the future? On the
other hand, how can consumers who are likely to be damaged in the
future because they do not know about the trickery ever realize that they
have standing to sue? Indeed, will not their discovery of the trickery,
which will alert them to the possibility of suit under the Uniform Act, ipso
facto destroy their standing by removing any likelihood of future injury? 1
Professor Dole answers the individual standing question by suggesting that
an allegation be made that the plaintiff desires to continue to do business
with the merchant, the deception will be difficult to detect and there is a
probability of its repetition. 2 Such an allegation should not be difficult
to make in cases where there are no satisfactory alternative sources of sup-
ply in the neighborhood.13
Ohio's version of the 1966 Revision of Federal Rule 23 authorizes class
suits if four general conditions are met: (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class; (3) the claims of the representative consumers
are typical of claims of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 4 Robnet v. Miller,
are either necessary or indispensable to the cause of action, or the suit is prosecuted by persons
who are interested in a common fund or property. Consumers who seek damages by a class ac-
tion do not fall into either category; rather, theirs is a spurious class action because their rights
are several, they are interested in a common question of law or fact and seek common relief.
Damage class actions are "spurious" in nature for, under the 1938 Federal Rule 23, they are
joinder devices and nor true class actions which traditionally have a res judicata impact upon
unnamed parties. In one of the consolidated cases in Snyder v. Harris, an aggrieved out-of-city
consumer of a gas company alleged damaged to himself of $7.81 resulting from illegal billing
and collection of a city franchise tax, and sought to aggregate claims of approximately 18,000
other out-of-city customers. See Starrs, The Consumer Class Action--Part 11: Considerations of
Procedure, 49 BosToN U.L REv. 407, 419-24, 463-67, 492-94 (1969). The proposed Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1970 would allow class actions on behalf of consumers victimized by
unfair consumer practices, provide for a broad range of remedies, confer jurisdiction over unfair
consumer practices on the federal courts and thereby eliminate the need to aggregate damages.
S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 204-06 (1970).
0 1 Dole, supra note 86, at 1112.
92 id. at 1113.
93 Often true in the cities. See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE, chs. 4 & 5 (1967).
94 Rule 23(A), Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, effective July 1, 1970. In addition to the four
general requirements imposed by Rule 23 (A), a plaintiff must satisfy the conditions of either
23(B)(1), (2) or (3). Rule 23(B)(1) authorizes a class action where individual litigation by a
member of the class creates a risk of inconsistent adjudications establishing incompatible stand-
ards for a party opponent, or individual adjudications would be dispositive of the interests of
other non-party class members or impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
"Examples of this situation might include a taxpayer's suit to invalidate municipal action or a
shareholder's individual claim to declare a dividend." J. MCCoRMACK, OHIO CIL RULES
PRAicCE 84 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McConMfACK). Rule 23(B) (2) authorizes a class
action whenever "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding de-
claratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.. 'This section is primarily designed for
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decided before the enactment of Rule 23, encourages consumer class ac-
tions. 5 Plaintiff purchasers of food freezers alleged they were promised
by individual defendants that in return for plaintiffs' obligating themselves
to buy the freezers, two defendants would supply plaintiffs' normal food
requirements for two years at one-half price. After notes and contracts
were signed, the notes were discounted to a loan company and no further
cut-rate food was supplied. Plaintiffs sought cancellation of the contracts,
surrender of cognovit notes, damages and injunctive relief. The appellate
court reversed a trial judge's dissolution of a temporary restraining order.
To the assertion by the defense that certain members of the class might
want to keep their freezers and thereby stand on the contract, the court re-
sponded that since the class included defrauded customers, it would be dif-
ficult to conceive of one who would elect to stand on the contract.9 The
Deeptive Trade Practices Act itself further encourages such class actions
by defining "person" as two or more legal entities having joint or com-
civil rights cases although other cases may fall within the section. Actions for damages are ex-
cluded in [sic] this section." MCCORMACK 84. A consumer class action seeking injunctive relief
falls within this section. "[A) n action looking to ... declaratory relief could be brought by a
numerous class of purchasers ... against a seller alleged to have undertaken to sell to that class
at prices higher than those set for other purchasers ...when the applicable law forbids such a
pricing differential." 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Note, to new Rule
23 (B) (2)). Rule 23 (B) (3) authorizes a class suit whenever "the court finds that the questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy." "This section would permit mass torts to be
prosecuted in a class suit if found to be the best vehicle for the adjudication of the controversy.
An example of a typical case brought under this section is the security fraud case where individ-
ual investors are in a poor position to seek redress [damages?] individually." McCORMACK
84. Where the action is characterized as a (B)(3) action there is a requirement that class mem-
bers be notified; and such members may elect to be excluded from the class. Ohio R. Civ. P.
23 (C) (2). The judgment in an action maintained as a class action binds all members of the
class in a (B)(1) or (B)(2) action, and all except excluded members in a (B)(3) action. Be-
cause of the difficulty of giving notice and the probability that a judgment in a (B)(3) action
will not bind non-party class members where no notice is given them, characterization as a
(B)(1), (B)(2) or (B)(3) action is important. McCORMACK 84-85.
95 105 Ohio App. 536, 152 N.E.2d 763 (1957). Contra, Davies v. Gas & Elec. Co., 151
Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949). Plaintiff gas consumer sued for damages and injunctive
relief based on fraud by dilution of the gas supplied; the court held that since there were
700,000 consumers scattered throughout Ohio the class action would not stand because the
right to redress depended on different local rate schedules, etc. However, this objection was
based on the conclusion there was no community of interest of persons comprising the "class"
with a right to recovery based on the same essential facts. This analysis isn't valid where plain-
tiffs seek injunctive relief against the deceptive practices alleged in the petition, which is the
authorized remedy under the Deceptive Practices Act. Indeed, proof of monetary damages is
obviated by the terms of the Act. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4165.03 (Page 1965). The
court's declaration in Davies that individual claims could not be aggregated to meet the juris-
dictional amount is superseded by Rule 2 3(F), supra note 90.
96 105 Ohio App. 536, 545, 152 N.E.2d 763, 766-67 (1957). Such a suggestion was ac-
cepted in Davies v. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 95, the court reasoning that some persons might
not wish to sue for tort damages, others might choose breach of contract rather than fraud as
the proper remedy; and still others might choose to sue for restitution. The fear expressed by
the court in Davies is met by the requirement that where an action is characterized as a Rule
23(B)(3) action, as a Davies-type claim for damages undoubtedly would be, non-party class
members must be notified of the pendency of the action, and may elect to be excluded, with the
result that those not notified aren't bound by the judgment. Supra, note 94.
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mon interest . 7  However, it is not at all certain that courts will react
favorably to such casesf 5  For example, what are the criteria by which it is
decided that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class ?"
PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION
It is an old saw that the laws of a people can be no better than the mech-
anism for their enforcement. The FTC is in a potentially powerful posi-
tion to move against "deceptive practices" including advertising under § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In a nine month period beginning
in December, 1969, it produced three notable opinions in the consumer
field.'00 The FTC has, however, been under heavy attack lately from its
detractors who condemn it as an agency low in competence and esprit de
corps, and lacking in any sense of priorities as to how to devote its efforts.
"Nader's Raiders" spent a summer studying the FTC and their criticisms
are published in book form. The American Bar Association reached the
same conclusion as the raiders.'0 1 Specifically the ABA pointed to the
failure of the FTC to plan and the crippling delay in its procedures as its
two greatest drawbacks1
0 2
Ohio has a Consumer Fraud Bureau attached to the Attorney General's
office, as have a number of other states, but such bureaus have also been
criticized for their ineffectiveness. The Ohio office sends a news letter to
public agencies-
But such Bureaus turn out to be a mixed blessing. Unscrupulous companies
soon learn that the most that might happen to them . . . is that their li-
cense might be suspended. To my knowledge, no fraudulent business-
97 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.01(E) (Page 1965).
98 Hall v. Coburn Corporation of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720 (1970). The
Consumer Protection Act of 1970 requires notice to be given to the FTC of an unfair consumer
practice, and bars consumer action if the FTC or the Attorney General files an action. S. 3201,
91st Cong., 2d. Sess. §§ 206(b)(1) and (3)(1970).
99 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), (you need "qualified, experi-
enced and . . .able" counsel); The court in Davies v. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 95, seemed
adversely impressed by the size of the dass-700 ,000. That shouldn't be a consideration where
equitable relief is sought. In such cases, the community of interest is more apparent than when
damages are sought.
100 In re All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc., FTC, 1969. CCH Trade Reg. Serv.
18,740 (respondent home improvement contractors' failure to disclose ability to assign negotiable
instrument free of personal defenses is an unfair trade practice); Leon A. Tashoff, FTC, 1968.
CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 18,606 (example of bait and switch advertising with respect to sale of
eyeglasses, failure to disclose finance charges and in some instances cash prices, all characterized
as unfair and deceptive practices); In re Household Sewing Machine Co., Inc., FTC, 1969. CCH
Trade Reg. Rep. 18,882 (example of bait and switch sales of sewing machines and misrepre-
sentation of year of machines, all characterized as unfair methods of competition in the advertis-
ing and sale of sewing machines).
101 Report of the ABA Commissiop to Study the Federal Trade Commission. (1969) 34-35.
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man has yet to be prosecuted and sent to jail by the Attorney General's
office [of New York]. Furthermore, the Attorney General's Consumer
Fraud Bureau turns out to be a major factor in why New York no longer
has consumer representation on the state level. Consumer affairs are, to use
a term of the ghetto, the "turf" of the Attorney General and he does not
want any competition. And so the consumers of New York are not or-
ganized and they are not represented, and legislative reforms proceed at a
snail's pace, if at all.103
Specific authorization of a class suit under Ohio's version of the Uni-
form Deceptive Trade Practices Act would undoubtedly be a positive step
in the direction of reform. Such a provision would encourage private en-
forcement of what is concededly a public problem, but one that could best
be dealt with by the private and public sector combined. I also think Ohio
should enact the catch-all provision of the Uniform Act which allows en-
joining "any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion
or of misunderstanding."10 This provision allows the statute to be inter-
preted by that process of judicial inclusion which allows for necessary
flexibility in the law to meet the ingenuity of the American businessman and
his legal counselor, who will undoubtedly see those gaps which the legisla-
ture could not anticipate.
In the public sector, the Ohio Legislature might want to consider statu-
tory authority for the Attorney General or any law enforcement official,
including city or county prosecutor, to petition a court for injunctive relief
involving deceptive trade practices. A few states have authorized such
actions. 10 5 Such legislation might give to the law enforcement official the
authority to petition the court to restore to any person, money or property
acquired by such illegal trade practices, and thus obviate the need for pri-
vate actions. New York has adopted a procedure whereby the mere threat
of an injunction may be sufficient to halt the activities without the need
for formal action. The Attorney General may promise not to seek an in-
junction against any company if it files "an assurance of discontinuance of
any act or practice" considered illegal under the act.106 It may also be
stipulated that the alleged violator make "voluntary payment" of the state's
"cost of investigation" in an amount up to 2,000 dollars.10 7  Noncompli-
103 Caplovitz, The Problems of the Poor Consumer: A Sodologist's Viewpoint, in Ohio State
Legal Services Association Course on Law and Poverty: The Consumer (1968). p. 1.05.
104 Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 2(12).
105 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 267 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); § 325.907(3) NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8 (1964); see MINN. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE §
51-15-07 (Supp. 1969). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.42 authorizes Prosecuting Attorneys
to seek injunctive relief rof fraudulent advertising, but it probably isn't as broad as the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act because of the requirement of "Scienter." Rosenblatt v. Cleveland, 20 Ohio
L. Abs. 106 (Ct. App. 1935). To eliminate ambiguity in the Ohio version of the Act, a re-
quirement of proof of "intent to deceive" should be negated. Supra, note 84.
106 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(15). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19:86:100 (Supp.
1970).
107 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(15). A total of $22,812.00 was collected by the state treasury
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ance by a company with its assurance could then constitute prima facie
evidence in any civil action or proceeding instituted by the Attorney Gen-
eral.10
8
under this statute according to the 1964 annual Report of the New York State Bureau of Con-
sumer Frauds & Protection on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. KATZ,
supra note 13, 35, n. 256.
108 N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(15).
